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Abstract 
This study investigates whether capital structure is value relevant for the equity 
investor. In this sense, the paper links empirical corporate finance issues with investment 
analysis. This study also integrates the Miller-Modigliani (MM) framework (1958) into an 
investment approach by estimating abnormal returns on leverage portfolios in the time-
series for different risk classes. For most risk classes, abnormal returns decline in firm 
leverage. Descriptive statistics, simple and multiple regressions are used to test the hold 
indicator  significance.  The  results  reflect  that  the  designed  measures  are  the  negative 
relationship between returns and leverage could also be due to the market’s pricing of the 
firm’s ability to raise funds if need be. Further avenues for research in this area include 
examining the stock return performance of companies based on the changes in leverage of 
the firms relative to their risk classes. It would be particularly noteworthy to examine the 
rate at which the information content of said changes is incorporated in the share prices of 
companies as well as in their long run returns This study encompasses all non-financial 
firms  across  the  five  sectors  that  cover  all  the  various  classes  of  risk.  This  study 
investigates neither the determinants of multiple capital structure choices nor changes in 
capital structures over time. Our main goal is to explore the effect of capital structure on 
cumulative  abnormal  returns.  This  study  also  examine  a  firm’s  cumulative  average 
abnormal returns by measuring leverage at the firm level and at the average level for the 
firm’s industry. And also examine other factors, such as size, price earnings, market-to-
book and betas. 
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Rezumat 
Acest  studiu  investighează  dacă  structura  de  capital  reprezintă  o  valoarea 
relevantă pentru investitorul de capital. În acest sens, lucrarea leagă aspectele empirice de 
finanţe  corporative  cu  analiza  investiţiilor.  De  asemenea,  studiul  integrează,  modelul 
Miller-Modigliani  (1958)  în  abordarea  investiţiilor  prin  estimarea  randamentelor 
anormale pe portofolii bazate pe efectul de levier în serii de timp pentru diferite clase de 
risc. Pentru cele mai multe clase de risc, randamentele anormale se diminuează în efectul 
de levier al firmei. Pentru a testa semnificaţia indicatorului propus sunt folosite statistici 
descriptive, regresia simplă şi multiplă. Rezultatele reflectă faptul că măsurile propuse 
arată relaţia negativă dintre randamente şi efectul de levier care, de asemenea, ar putea fi 
datorită preţului de piaţă cu privire la abilitatea firmei de a strânge fonduri dacă este Management Management Management Management    
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necesar.  Alte  căi  de  cercetare  în  acest  domeniu  includ  examinarea  performanţei  de 
randament al stocului companiilor pe baza modificărilor în efectul de levier al firmelor în 
raport cu clasele de risc al acestora. Ar fi extrem de interesantă examinarea ratei la care 
conţinutul de informaţii al acestor schimbări este inclus în preţurile acţiunilor companiilor, 
precum şi în randamentele lor pe termen lung. Acest studiu cuprinde toate firmele non-
financiare din cele cinci sectoare care acoperă toate clasele variate de risc. Acest studiu nu 
investighează  nici  factorii  care  determină  alegerea  structurii  multiple  de  capital,  nici 
modificările în structurile de capital de-a lungul timpului. Scopul nostru principal este de a 
explora  efectul  structurii  capitalului  asupra  randamentelor  cumulative  anormale.  Acest 
studiu examinează, de asemenea, media randamentelor cumulative anormale ale unei firme 
prin măsuarea efectului de levier la nivelul firmei şi la nivelul mediu al industriei firmei. 
De asemenea, sunt examinaţi şi alţi factori, cum ar fi dimensiunea, câştigurile de preţ, 
valoarea de piaţă faţă de valoarea contabilă şi indicii beta. 
 
Cuvinte-cheie: structura capitalului; costul agenţiei; valoarea firmei 
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Introduction 
 
heoretical finance has always regarded debt as one of the principle 
sources of financial risk. According to Miller-Modigliani (MM)’s 
seminal  work  on  capital  structure,  firm  value  is  independent  of 
financing  decisions.  The  authors  rigorously  show  that  the  value  of  a  firm  is 
determined by the rate of return on real assets—and not by the mix of securities 
that are issued. An immediate implication of MM’s propositions on equity returns 
is that they should increase in leverage. This is indeed the case in the cross section 
of firms in a certain risk class of Utilities and Oil & Gas industries as revealed by 
the authors’ findings. Hence, we classify our sample by type of industry. 
  In MM, equity returns are represented by the average cost of capital in a 
one year period and estimations are conducted in a cross-section of a particular risk 
class. We represent equity returns as cumulative abnormal returns for a holding 
period of one year, which representation is easier for an investor to interpret. We 
use panel data that contains information for a 25-year period and combines the 
cross-section with the time series. In MM, the only independent variable is the 
leverage ratio and it’s square to test the linearity of the relationship. In our study, in 
addition to the leverage ratio and its square, we use five additional variables that 
reflect idiosyncratic risk, including the risk factors described by Fama and French 
(1992) and the particular environment’s cost of borrowing in order to account for 
changes in the cost of capital in the time series that explain abnormal returns. MM 
conduct their tests within two industries, each representing a coherent risk class, 
namely the oil and utilities sectors. We, however, do not limit our research simply 
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to two sectors. Instead, our study encompasses all non-financial firms across the 
nine sectors that cover all the various classes of risk. 
The  relationship  between  capital  structure  and  firm  value  has  been  the 
subject  of  considerable  debate,  both  theoretically  and  in  empirical  research. 
Throughout  the  literature,  debate  has  centered  on  whether  there  is  an  optimal 
capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is 
irrelevant to the individual firm's value. 
In their seminal articles, Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) demonstrate 
that, in a frictionless world, financial leverage is unrelated to firm value, but in a 
world with tax-deductible interest payments, firm value and capital structure are 
positively  related.  Miller  (1977)  added  personal  taxes  to  the  analysis  and 
demonstrated that optimal debt usage occurs on a macro-level, but it does not exist 
at the firm level. Interest deductibility at the firm level is offset at the investor 
level. 
Other  researchers  have  added  imperfections,  such  as  bankruptcy  costs 
(Baxter & Nevins, 1967; Kim, 1978), agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and 
gains  from  leverage-induced  tax  shields  (DeAngelo  &  Masulis,  1980),  to  the 
analysis and have maintained that an optimal capital structure may exist. Empirical 
work by Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Long & Malitz (1985) and Titman and 
Wessels  (1988)  largely  supports  bankruptcy  costs  or  agency  costs  as  partial 
determinants of leverage and of optimal capital structure. 
DeAngelo  and  Masulis  (1980)  demonstrated  that  with  the  presence  of 
corporate tax shield substitutes for debt (e.g. depreciation, depletion, amortization, 
and  investment  tax  credits),  each  firm  will  have  "a  unique  interior  optimum 
leverage decision with or without leverage related costs" (p. 3). The DeAngelo-
Masulis  model  implies  that  a  firm's  optimal  capital  structure  will  be  industry 
related  in  part  because  of  the  evidence  that  tax  rates  vary  across  industry 
(Rosenberg, 1969). Masulis (1983) argues further that when firms which issue debt 
are moving toward the industry average from below, the market will react more 
positively than when the firm is moving away from the industry average. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: Section 2 
presents a review of literature. Section 3 describes data and research methodology. 
Section 4 reports results of the statistical analyses. Section 5 summarizes the main 
conclusion and recommendations of the study. 
 
  Literature review 
 
Korteweg (2004) also tests the aforementioned MM proposition. His tests 
are based on pure capital structure changes (i.e., exchange offers). He controls for 
business risk by assuming non-zero debt betas and uses a time series approach. In 
our  study,  we  use  a  cross-sectional  approach  to  test  whether  leverage  is  
value-relevant  by  investigating  excess  returns  generated  by  holding  portfolios 
based  on  a  company’s  leverage.  Since  our  sample  is  not  limited  and  includes  Management Management Management Management    
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a cross-section of all firms, we do not assume zero debt betas and avoid additional 
assumptions  when  calculating  separate  debt  betas  and  asset  betas.  Hull  (1999) 
measures market reaction to common stock offerings with the sole purpose of debt 
reduction and reports a negative immediate response — increasingly more so for 
firms further from the industry norm. Our sample is not as limited as Hull’s and 
includes a cross-sectional examination of all firms. Additionally, we do not employ 
a  short-run  perspective.  While  Hull  measures  immediate  wealth  maximization 
using three-day cumulative returns, we assume a one-year holding period for our 
portfolios, which assumption is in keeping with MM and Schwartz (1959). 
Dimitrov and Jain (2005) measure the effect of leverage changes on stock 
returns as well as on earnings-based measures of performance. Their results reveal 
a negative correlation between debt-to-equity ratio and risk-adjusted stock returns. 
The authors study how changes in levels of debt are negatively associated with 
contemporaneous  and  future-adjusted  returns.  In  this  paper,  we  investigate  the 
ability of leverage to predict stock returns by using a cross-section of these ratios 
rather than changes over time. Also, we do not distinguish between the operating 
and investing activities of a firm, as we are concerned with the excess returns an 
investor  can  make  from  the  overall  activities  of  a  company  in  a  one-year 
investment horizon. 
Miao (2005) develops an industry model of equilibrium between capital 
structure  choices  and  production  decisions  made  by  firms  facing  idiosyncratic 
technological  shocks.  His  results  show  that  technology  (i.e.,  productivity)  is 
important in determining a firm’s probability of survival and leverage ratio. His 
work also looks into understanding the theoretical impact of financing policies on 
firm turnover. In this paper, we classify our sample according to industry in order 
to  study  cross-sectional  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  We  do  not  individually 
address the financing needs or production decisions of each industry. 
Alti  (2006)  finds  that  hot-market  firms  leverage  ratios  increase 
significantly two years following the Initial Public Offering; however, cold market 
firms  appear  to  be  content  with  the  leverage  ratios  they  attain  at  the  IPO.  He 
concludes that market timing is an important determinant of financing activity in 
the short-run but that its long-run effects are limited. Ahn et al. (2006) investigate 
the relationship between investment patterns and leverage. They show that firms 
with diversified investments have higher leverage than firms with more focused 
investments. 
Li et al. (2006) show that financial institution owner- ship is determined by 
macro  corporate  governance  factors  such  as  corporate  disclosure  requirements. 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) use total stockholdings of financial institutions from 
around the world and find that banks have no discernable impact on firm value. 
Studies that focus on bank ownership use primarily Germany (Gorton & Schmid, 
2000; Chirinko & Elston, 2006). However, recent evidence from China suggests a 
negative effect of bank ownership on firm performance (Lin et al., 2009). Management Management Management Management    
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Gillan and Starks (2003) state that the rise of professional money managers 
as a large shareholder group in companies can increase the potential for monitoring 
of firm management. Cornett et al. (2007) show that better .firm performance is 
associated with the presence of institutions without potential business relationships 
with the firm. 
In Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) examine both cash own rights and 
voting rights of banks and find that firm performance is positively affected by bank 
shareholding, while Chirinko and Elston (2006) report that bank control affects 
company  profitability  negatively,  although  significance  is  weak.  Barucci  and 
Mattesini  (2008)  investigate  large  Italian  .firms  and  find  little  support  for  the 
existence  of  a  virtuous  bank  non-financial  company  shareholding  relation 
associated with governance/monitoring arguments. Furthermore, Lin et al. (2009) 
provide evidence of a negative effect of bank ownership on firm performance in 
China. 
More recently, a branch of the literature examines the monitoring activities 
of  institutional  investors  for  cross-country  samples.  Li  et  al.  (2006)  show  that 
strong  governance  environments  act  to  strengthen  monitoring  ability  such  that 
more financial institutions are encouraged to hold concentrated equity positions. 
Chen et al. (2007) find that banks and insurance companies are more supportive of 
management  actions  than  other  types  of  institutional  investors  in  ant  takeover 
amendment proposals. Finally, Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that all institutional 
investors have a strong preference for the stock of large .firms and .firms with good 
governance.  Firms  with  higher  ownership  by  independent  institutions,  with 
potentially fewer business ties to firm, have higher firm valuations whereas bank 
ownership has no impact on firm value. They interpret this as evidence for the 
monitoring role of independent institutions. 
This  study  investigates  neither  the  determinants  of  multiple  capital 
structure choices nor changes in capital structures over time. Our main goal is to 
explore the effect of capital structure on cumulative abnormal returns. In doing so, 
we control for idiosyncratic risk factors commonly used in investments. These risk 
factors include price-earnings ratio, size (Banz, 1981; Chan & Chen, 1991), book-
to-market ratio (Chan, Hamao & Lakonishok, 1991)) and a combination of these, 
including beta (Fama & French, 1992; Fama & French, 1996). 
We  also  investigate  the  impact  of  industry  leverage  on  stock  returns. 
Schwartz  (1959)  explains  that  the  optimal  capital  structure  varies  for  firms  in 
different  industries  because  asset  structures  and  stability  of  earnings,  which 
determine inherent risk classes, vary for different types of production. We argue 
that  industry  leverage  should  prove  useful  in  predicting  the  direction  and 
magnitude of stock returns when investors evaluate a stock’s true worth. Titman 
(1984)  concludes  that  firms  manufacturing  machines  and  equipment  should  be 
financed with relatively less debt. Titman and Wessels (1988), while examining the 
determinants of capital structure, find that debt levels are negatively related to the 
uniqueness  of  a  firm’s  line  of  business.  While  our  model  does  not  study  the Management Management Management Management    
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determinants of capital structure, we do examine the relevance of industry leverage 
on stock returns. 
 
Data and methodology 
  
Sample and variables models 
 
The sample was chosen from all Jordanian industrial firms listed on the 
Amman stock exchange3 (ASE) for the period 2005 to 2008. The data used in the 
analysis were collected from the annual reports of the Amman stock exchange. The 
final sample contains 58 firm-observations. The number chosen of sample depend 
on available of information on financial reports. 
In this study we use the capital gearing definition to represent the leverage 
of companies in the sample. It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm 
and is defined as: 
Leverage (%) = (Long term debt+ Short term debt & Current Portion of 
Long term debt) / (Total Capital+ Short term debt & Current Portion of 
Long term debt) 
Schwartz (1959) argues that the narrow definition of financial structure — 
i.e.,  that  it  is  restricted  to  stocks  and  bonds—ignores  the  large  measure  of 
substitutability  between  the  various  forms  of  debt;  thus,  a  broader  definition 
encompassing the breadth of all liabilities and claims of ownership must be used. 
He proposes the ratio of total debt to net worth as the best single measure of gross 
risk Firms in various industries have different asset structures that are financed by 
cash  flows  generated  from  various  forms  of  debt  and  equity.  The  use  of  both 
variables’ book values ensures that we measure the capital structure via the cash 
flows generated at the time those assets are financed. Schwartz (1959) also argues 
that  an  optimum  capital  structure  for  a  widely  held  company  is  one  which 
maximises the long-run value of the common stock per share. Our analysis is based 
on the same understanding. The use of book values for debt and equity has the 
additional  advantage  of  using  the  market  value  of  equity  neither  to  define  the 
change in value nor in concurrent capital structure 
Following Fama and French (1992), we account for the difference between 
the two by using book-to-market ratio as a risk factor. Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
suggested  that  the  significance  of  the  historical  book-to-market  in  leverage 
regressions  may  be  due  to  the  noise  in  the  current  book-to-market.  We  use  a 
company’s market value to represent company size. Market capitalisation is the 
share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. The price-to-book 
value refers to a company’s share price divided by the net book value. The market 
risk measure is the beta coefficient (β), which we estimate over a five-year period 
in a rolling window using monthly data. We also take into account the impact of 
market conditions on capital structure by examining interest rate.  Management Management Management Management    
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Stock returns for each company are calculated monthly using percentage 
change in consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends splits and rights issues, 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAARit) on portfolios are calculated starting on 
May 1 each year. 
Abnormal return on day t for stock i is given as: 
ARit = Rit − E(Rit), 
where: 
Rit      – is the monthly return of the share i on day t;  
E(Rit) – is the expected return on stock i in day t, which is represented by 
the return on FTSE-All share index.  
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated for the 12 months 
following the period of portfolio formation and t-tests (Lo and MacKinley, 1988) 
are used to test if CAARs are significantly different from zero using the following 
equations: 
CAAR = Sum ARit  (1) 
t-test = (CAART) / s(CAART),  (2) 
where s(CAART) = s(ART)/(T+1)½, and s(ART) is the variance over T months. 
 
  The next step in our analysis is to determine whether cumulative abnormal 
returns at the stock level can be explained  by the leverage of  the firms and to 
examine a number of idiosyncratic risk  factors in the  cross-section and interest 
rates that control for changes in cost of capital within the environment of the time 
series. Idiosyncratic risk factors include: market risk; size price-to-earnings ratio; 
and price-to- book ratio. First, we run the below regression in the full sample. Then 
we partition the data according to the different risk classes represented by each 
industry,  formally  testing  for  the  effect  of  leverage  in  each  risk  class  while 
accounting for the effect of these additional factors on CAARs. 
  CAAR = a + b1LEVERAGEit + b2BETAit + b3SIZEit + b4BMit + 
 + b5PEit +εit   (3) 
In equation (3), CAAR is defined as in equation (1); a stands for constant; 
LEVERAGE is measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity plus debt; BETA 
is the market risk estimated over the preceding five years; SIZE refers to the log of 
total market capitalisation; BM and PE refer to the ratio of price-to-book and the 
ratio of price to earnings respectively; and ε is the error term. We estimate equation 
(3) using GMM estimators3 and fixed effects for firms.GMM estimators ensure 
that no assumptions are made about the variables’ distributional properties, most of 
which are not normally distributed. Following Flannery et al. (2004), we use fixed 
effects for firms in the panel to account for the richness of individual firms’ unique Management Management Management Management    
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information  and  for  the  possibility  of  varying  degrees  of  risk  acceptance  in 
ownership decisions (Schwartz, 1959). 
 
  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the six variables: cumulative 
average  abnormal  returns  (CAARs);  leverage;  beta;  size;  price  to  earnings  and 
price  are  calculated  from  yearly  data;  leverage  are  as  of  year  end.  The  mean 
leverage  is  0.615  and  standard  deviation  0.709,  The  mean  beta  is  78.52  and 
standard deviation 11.60, The mean size is 7.11 and standard deviation 0.77, The 
mean price to book value is 49.4 and standard deviation 27.8, The mean price to 
earnings  is  535.6  and  standard  deviation  27.8,  The  mean  cumulative  average 
abnormal return 0.615 and standard deviation 0.714. 
 
Descriptive statistics for (LEVERAGE, BETA, SIZE, BM, PE and CAAR) 
overall years 
Table 1 
Year   Index  LEV  BETA  SIZE  BM  PE  CAAR 
2005  
to 2008  Mean  .615  78.52  7.11  49.41  53.56  .615 
  N  232  232  232  232  232  232 
  Std. Dev  .709  11.60  .77  14.8  27.8  .714 
  Maximum  5.15  16199.7  9.47  774.0  13475.0  6.5 
  Minimum  001  3825.6  .001  22464.0  22068  .003 
 
  Empirical regression results 
 
Tables 2-6 from Appendix, report Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARs). Stock returns for each company are calculated monthly using percent 
change in consecutive closing prices that have been adjusted for dividends splits 
and rights issues across the leverage deciles for the entire sample as well as for 
each risk class. 
We  understand  from  the  above  analysis  that  the  relationship  between 
leverage and holding period returns is not the same for all risk classes. For most 
risk classes, CAARs decrease in leverage; firms with low leverage ratios can earn 
significantly higher CAARs than can firms with high leverage.  
The CAARs for portfolios based on leverage as well as on market risk. 
Overall, cumulative abnormal returns are higher for companies with low market 
risk  and  low  leverage.  For  example,  companies  in  the  lowest  beta  coefficient 
deciles and the lowest debt deciles earn excess returns, while companies in the 
highest market risk and highest leverage deciles earn negative abnormal returns of Management Management Management Management    
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companies  with  high  beta  coefficients  and  low  debt  levels  earn  high  abnormal 
returns,  while  companies  with  high  beta  coefficients  and  high  leverage  earn 
negative abnormal returns as low as companies with low market risk earn positive 
abnormal returns in most leverage levels, with higher abnormal returns for lower 
debt levels. 
The results indicate that the CAARs for portfolios based on leverage and 
price-earnings  (PE)  ratios.  Overall  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  higher  for 
companies with low leverages and low PE ratios. The CAARs for portfolios based 
on leverage and price-to-book value (PTBV). Our results indicate that CAARs are 
higher for companies with low leverage and low PTBV. The CAARs for portfolios 
based on leverage and size. Our results indicate that CAARs are slightly higher for 
small companies with low leverage. 
The results indicate of the cross-sectional regressions for the full sample as 
well as for the different risk classes. Coefficients for fixed effects are significant in 
all estimations. For the overall sample, cross-sectional regressions reveal a negative 
and  significant  relationship  between  leverage  and  cumulative  abnormal  returns. 
Cumulative abnormal returns decline  in leverage.  All other variables,  including 
price-earnings ratio, price-to-book ratio, size, beta and interest rates, have negative 
and significant coefficients. CAARs are higher for low PE, low BTMV, as well as 
during periods of low beta size except the variable size in year 2006, 2007 and 
2008, variable PE in year 2006, 2008 and variable BM in year 2008.  
This  is  an  interesting  result,  as  it  implies  that  MM’s  proposition—that 
returns increase in leverage—holds true for overall increases in leverage in a risk 
class, while for individual firms that increase in leverage, returns fall—as shown in 
more recent studies (Korteweg, 2004). There is a considerable amount of literature 
on the differences in leverage due to industry characteristics. Other show that there 
is a  difference  between  mean  industry  capital  structures  and  that  each  industry 
tends to have an optimal debt ratio due to tax benefits. Bradley et al. (1984) report 
that leverage decreases with R&D expenditures. Barclay et al. (1995) illustrate that 
leverage  is  high  for  regulated  firms  and  low  for  high-tech  industries.  Others 
provide  evidence  that  firms  that  rely  on  debt  is  more  likely  to  reduce  their 
investment  in  market  share-building  during  downturns.  Hull  (1999)  shows  that 
industry  debt-to-equity  ratio  is  a  useful  benchmark  with  which  investors  can 
evaluate  a  stock’s  attractiveness.  Since  MM,  other  risk  factors  have  been 
introduced which have become popular in academic as well as practitioner-oriented 
contexts.  Of  course,  the  question  arises  whether  leverage  ratio  is  the  sole 
contributing factor or rather only one of the contributing factors in the cumulative 
returns. Below, we will undertake a series of tests in order to investigate if other 
factors or combination thereof could have contributed to the obtained results. Management Management Management Management    
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  Conclusion and recommendations  
 
This study is an empirical work that investigates whether capital structure 
is value-relevant for the equity investor firms’ capital structure policies appear to 
be  largely  consistent  with  the  existence  of  leverage  targets.  Because  capital 
structure  is  endogenous,  we  argue  that  the  optimal  financial  policy  is  one  that 
advocates  low  leverage,  so  as  to  mitigate  agency  problems  while  preserving 
financial flexibility. Profitable firms may keep their leverage levels low so as to 
prevent too a proportion of profit being used for interest payments. This notion 
leads to another school of thought: i.e., whether firms, in their attempt to keep 
leverage levels low, avoid taking on profitable opportunities and investments.  
Hence throwing away their firm value, the negative relationship between 
returns and leverage could also be due to the market’s pricing of the firm’s ability 
to  raise  funds  if  need  be.  Further  avenues  for  research  in  this  area  include 
examining  the  stock  return  performance  of  companies  based  on  the  changes  in 
leverage  of  the  firms  relative  to  their  risk  classes.  It  would  be  particularly 
noteworthy to examine the rate at which the information content of said changes is 
incorporated in the share prices of companies as well as in their long run returns.  
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Appendix 
 
Regression Analysis: Capital Structure and Firm Value (2005) 
Table 2 
Dependent Variable: CAAR 
year  Index  LEV  BETA  SIZE  BM  PE  Total 
2005  R  .440  .284  .389  .377  .012  .517 
  R^2  .320  ..081  .151  .126  .000  .267 
  Adj- R^2  .112  .065  .136  -.212  -.018  .196 
  SIG  .045**  .030**  .003***  .087*  .042**  .005*** 
  F- test  ----  ---  ---  --  --  3.784 
  T-test  -1.060  -2.221  -3.158  -.576  -1.089  --- 
  Beta 
Coefficient 
-.140  -.284  -.389  -.077  -.012  --- 
Significant at p <0.10 * Significant at p< 0.05 ** Significant at p< 0.01*** 
 
Regression Analysis: Capital Structure and Firm Value (2006) 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: CAAR 
year  Index  LEV  BETA  SIZE  BM  PE  Total 
2006  R  .415  .340  .168  .320  .123  .538 
  R^2  .346  ..116  .028  .102  .015  .289 
  Adj- R^2  .229  .100  .011  .086  -.003  .221 
  SIG  .021**  .009***  .209  .014**  .360  .003*** 
  F- test  ----  ---  ---  --  --  4.235 
  T-test  -1.650  -2.705  -1.272  -2.526  -.360  --- 
  Beta 
Coefficient 
-.215  -.340  -.168  -.320  -.123  --- 
Significant at p <0.10 * Significant at p< 0.05 ** Significant at p< 0.01*** 
 
Regression Analysis: Capital Structure and Firm Value (2007) 
Table 4 
Dependent Variable: CAAR 
year  Index  LEV  BETA  SIZE  BM  PE  Total 
2007  R  .303  .322  .027  .309  .147  .422 
  R^2  .241  ..104  .001  .212  .022  .178 
  Adj- R^2  .224  .068  -.017  -.116  .004  .099 
  SIG  .067*  .014**  .840  .056*  ..078*  .063* 
  F- test  ----  ---  ---  ----  ---  2.254 
  T-test  -1.554  -2.547  -.203  -.823  -1.112  -- 
  Beta 
Coefficient 
-.203  -.322  -.027  -.109  -.147  --- 
Significant at p <0.10 * Significant at p< 0.05 ** Significant at p< 0.01*** Management Management Management Management    
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Regression Analysis: Capital Structure and Firm Value (2008) 
Table 5 
Dependent Variable: CAAR 
year  Index  LEV  BETA  SIZE  BM  PE  Total 
2008  R  .420  .416  .071  .071  .102  .327 
  R^2  .214  .247  .005  .005  .010  .177 
  Adj- R^2  -.123  .330  -.013  -.013  -.007  -.212 
  SIG  .007***  .032**  .594  .594  .446  .078* 
  F- test  ----  ---  ---  --  --  3.866 
  T-test  -2.903  -2.654  -.536  -.536  -.768  --- 
  Beta 
Coefficient 
-.120  -.216  -.071  -.071  -.102  --- 
Significant at p <0.10 * Significant at p< 0.05 ** Significant at p< 0.01*** 
 
Regression Analysis: Capital Structure and Firm Value (2005- 2008) 
Table 6 
Dependent Variable: CAAR 
year  Index  LEV  BETA  SIZE  BM  PE  Total 
2005 -
-2008  R  .211  .315  .447  .538  .331  .231 
  R^2  .123  .213  .232  .321  .231  .217 
  Adj- R^2  -.234  .119  -.122  -.143  -.233  -.325 
  SIG  .056*  .081*  .089*  .032**  .067*  .043** 
  F- test  ----  ---  ---  --  --  2.786 
  T-test  -.166  -1.755  -.708  -.573  -1.478  -- 
  Beta 
Coefficient 
-.011  -.115  -.047  -.038  -.031  --- 
Significant at p <0.10 * Significant at p< 0.05 ** Significant at p< 0.01*** 
 
 
 
 